[88111] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: The Backhoe: A Real Cyberthreat?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Frank Coluccio)
Fri Jan 20 13:53:55 2006
From: Frank Coluccio <frank@dticonsulting.com>
To: nanog@merit.edu
Reply-To: frank@dticonsulting.com
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2006 12:53:28 -0600
Errors-To: owner-nanog@merit.edu
>My argument simply is if this kind of awareness =0D
>can be made more broadly available you end up with =0D
>a more resilient infrastructure overall.=0D
=0D
Sean, would you care to list the route, facility, ownership and customer=0D
attributes of the data base that you'd make public, and briefly explain the=
=0D
access controls you would impose on same? =0D
=0D
If this is not what you originally intended, then please show me the way ..=
. thanks.=0D
=0D
=0D
Frank =0D
=0D
On Fri Jan 20 9:19 , sgorman1@gmu.edu sent:=0D
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=0D
As you mentioned before this is largely because the customer (SIAC) was=
savvy=0D
enough to set the reuirements and had the money to do it. A lot of that sav=
iness=0D
came from lessons learned from 9/11 and fund transfer. Similar measures wer=
e=0D
taken with DoD's GIG-BE, again because the customer was knowlegable and had=
the=0D
financial clout to enforce the requirements and demand the information. An=
=0D
anonymous data pool is just one suggestion of a market based mechanism to d=
o it.=0D
=0D
----- Original Message -----=0D
From: Michael.Dillon@btradianz.com=0D
Date: Friday, January 20, 2006 5:37 am=0D
Subject: =0D
=0D
>=0D
> > Imagine if 60 Hudson and 111 8th=0D
> > were to go down at the same time? Finding means to mitigate this=0D
> > threat is not frivolously spending the taxpayer's money, IMO;=0D
> > although perhaps removing fiber maps is not the best way to=0D
> > address this.=0D
>=0D
> No, removing fiber maps will not address this problem=0D
> now that you have pinpointed the addresses that they=0D
> should attack.=0D
>=0D
> Separacy is the key to addressing this problem. Separate=0D
> circuits along separate routes connecting separate routers=0D
> in separate PoPs. Separacy should be the mantra, not=0D
> obscurity.=0D
>=0D
> End-to-end separation of circuits is how SFTI and other=0D
> financial industry networks deal with the issue of continuity=0D
> in the face of terrorism and other disasters. In fact, now=0D
> that trading is mediated by networked computers, the physical=0D
> location of the exchange is less vulnerable to terrorists because=0D
> the real action takes place in redundant data centers connected=0D
> by diverse separate networks. Since 9-11 was a direct attack on=0D
> the financial services industry, people within the industry=0D
> worldwide, have been applying the lessons learned in New York.=0D
> Another 9-11 is simply not possible today.=0D
>=0D
> --Michael Dillon=0D
>=0D
>=0D
>=0D
> =0D
