[83012] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Your router/switch may be less secure than you think
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Michael.Dillon@btradianz.com)
Wed Aug 3 11:26:29 2005
In-Reply-To: <87oe8f6s0y.fsf@valhalla.seastrom.com>
To: nanog@merit.edu
From: Michael.Dillon@btradianz.com
Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2005 15:48:27 +0100
Errors-To: owner-nanog@merit.edu
> > We should all be looking to the security auditing work done by
> > the OpenBSD team for an example of how systems can be=20
> > cleaned up, fixed, and locked down if there is a will to do so.
>=20
> Beer, unsupported assertions, and lack of rigorous audit methodology
> can be blended together to make one's code more secure?
Perhaps you aren't aware of what the OpenBSD team accomplished?
Their techniques may not be rigorously documented but they
have been used in other projects:
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~angelos/Papers/posse-chapter.pdf
ABSTRACT
This chapter reports on our experiences with POSSE, a project=20
studying ?Portable Open Source Security Elements? as part of the=20
larger DARPA effort on Composable High Assurance Trusted Systems.=20
We describe the organization created to manage POSSE and the=20
significant acceleration in producing widely used secure software
that has resulted. ...
The OpenBSD team provide a brief overview of their process here:
http://www.openbsd.org/security.html
And a security consulting company describes the lessons of=20
OpenBSD here:
http://www.openlysecure.org/openbsd/security/sec=5Flessons
Their process has some parallels in the activities of groups like
the Columbia Accident Inquiry Board and the 911 Commission.=20
Openness, rigourous examination, attention to detail...
--Michael Dillon
