[81052] in North American Network Operators' Group

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Re: the problems being solved -- or not

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Russ White)
Tue May 24 07:42:25 2005

Date: Tue, 24 May 2005 07:41:49 -0400 (Eastern Daylight Time)
From: Russ White <ruwhite@cisco.com>
Reply-To: Russ White <riw@cisco.com>
To: Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
Cc: Tony Li <tony.li@tony.li>, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>,
	Geoff Huston <cidr-report@potaroo.net>,
	Bill Manning <bmanning@ep.net>, nanog@nanog.org
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.61.0505240937010.4256@netcore.fi>
Errors-To: owner-nanog@merit.edu



> Let's look at Tony's points above.  These solutions cannot deal with the 
> last case, i.e., the "owner" of the prefix decides to advertise more 
> specifics (and the ISPs pass that crap through).  Then we're left with 
> attacks where someone else advertises an equal route, or someone 
> advertises a more specific.

One of the various policies available within the soBGP specs is the ability 
for the owner of an address block to state: "The longest prefix within this 
block will be /x." This means that if you own 10.1.0.0/16, you can say: 
"The longest prefix length within 10.1.0.0/16 will be a /17." Or you can 
say: "The longest prefix within 10.1.0.0/17 will be a /18, and the longest 
within 10.1.1.0/17 will be a /20." Now, if someone attempts to steal your 
traffic by advertising a longer prefix, anyone actually checking would toss 
their routes.

Yes, you could advertise the same length, of course, but then, if the 
origin doesn't match, and/or the AS Path is bogus, they're toast, as well.

:-)

Russ

__________________________________
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