[81048] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: soBGP deployment
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Alexei Roudnev)
Tue May 24 05:06:31 2005
From: "Alexei Roudnev" <alex@relcom.net>
To: "Florian Weimer" <fw@deneb.enyo.de>,
"Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
Cc: "Pekka Savola" <pekkas@netcore.fi>, "Randy Bush" <randy@psg.com>,
"vijay gill" <vijay@umbc.edu>, <nanog@merit.edu>
Date: Tue, 24 May 2005 02:05:27 -0700
Errors-To: owner-nanog@merit.edu
Yes, corect - registry is as accurate as it used for the routing decisions.
The more it is used, the better is feedback and the faster
it will fix unavoidable errors.
No one registry can be accurate until it is used for every day operations.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Florian Weimer" <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
Cc: "Pekka Savola" <pekkas@netcore.fi>; "Randy Bush" <randy@psg.com>; "vijay
gill" <vijay@umbc.edu>; <nanog@merit.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2005 1:44 AM
Subject: Re: soBGP deployment
>
> * Steven M. Bellovin:
>
> > Fundamentally, the answer to this question is this: how accurate do you
> > think the routing registries are?
>
> I don't think it's important how accurate they are *now*, but how
> accurate they will be when some "secure" BGP version makes them (or,
> more precisely, the route registration process) the weakest link in
> the chain. The fact that careful checking on the ISP side protects
> other ISPs only (and your own business interests just in a very
> indirect fashion) makes me believe that securing BGP will be *very*
> hard.
