[77195] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: The entire mechanism is Wrong!
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Joe Maimon)
Sun Jan 16 11:04:02 2005
Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2005 11:01:59 -0500
From: Joe Maimon <jmaimon@ttec.com>
To: Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine <brunner@nic-naa.net>
Cc: nanog <nanog@merit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <200501161147.j0GBlkQ7036427@nic-naa.net>
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine wrote:
>Gentlemen and Ladies,
>
>I concur with the view expressed by Bob Fox (IANA-134), that the
>"current method only favours Verisign and crooks."
>
>
>The hijacking of panix.com, and the post-hijacking response of VGRS,
>which could unilaterally act, but choses not to, for its own reasons,
>and MelburneIT, which could unilaterally act, but choses to not act
>until 72 hours after being noticed, if then, is a counter-example to
>any claim that the current method has any rational application to
>domain names that are "mission critical", that is, used for something
>other than proping up some shoddy trademark claim by some party that
>doesn't even use the dns for core operational practice.
>
>It doesn't reflect very well on the registries and registrars either.
>
>Eric Brunner-Williams
>CTO Wampumpeag, LLC
>Operator, USA Webhost, IANA-439, CORE-124
>
>
>
>
Do you mean by that the "No-Hijack" bit be set by default?
Or perhaps do you mean previous owners can call in a "stop order" or
"dispute" the transfer unilaterally within X days of occurence, much
like it works for many REAL money transactions?
How are trademark domains relevant to panix.com?
Joe
