[77066] in North American Network Operators' Group
RE: Proper authentication model
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Hannigan, Martin)
Wed Jan 12 12:59:24 2005
From: "Hannigan, Martin" <hannigan@verisign.com>
To: "'Joe Abley'" <jabley@isc.org>
Cc: NANOG list <nanog@merit.edu>
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2005 12:58:43 -0500
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Joe Abley [mailto:jabley@isc.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2005 12:05 PM
> To: Hannigan, Martin
> Cc: NANOG list
> Subject: Re: Proper authentication model
>
>
>
> On 12 Jan 2005, at 11:53, Hannigan, Martin wrote:
>
> >> You mean you'd *request* a different path from different providers.
> >
> > Provisioning a circuit from two different ^providers^, other than
> > your OC3 provider.
>
> I realise that's what you meant.
>
> My point was that competing, differently-named and
> organisationally-separate suppliers of network services
> frequently use
> common suppliers for metro fibre, long-haul transport,
> building access,
> etc. Just because you buy different services from different providers
> doesn't mean there will be no common points of failure.
There may be common points of failure like a carrier hotel, but I
haven't been told I couldn't see loop or longhaul maps when planning
a circuit, except when buying from other than a carrier[1] or tier2.
Primary and protect should be geographically seperated and if
your carrier isn't buying access to BOTH conduits in your entrance
facility, you should ask why. I just don't usually see this problem
and I've *never* not been able to get into a facility remotely by
the diversified frame M/S method.
If we're talking semantics, order type 2 ds0s.
[1] I'm talking RBOC tier1 for the most part. I would consider tier 1
to be SBC, AT&T, MCI, Sprint, etc. Facilities based.
-M<
