[72393] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: VeriSign's rapid DNS updates in .com/.net
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu)
Fri Jul 9 17:06:08 2004
To: "Christopher L. Morrow" <christopher.morrow@mci.com>
Cc: Deepak Jain <deepak@ai.net>, nanog@merit.edu
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 09 Jul 2004 20:37:18 -0000."
<Pine.GSO.4.58.0407092036560.12790@sharpie.argfrp.us.uu.net>
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Date: Fri, 09 Jul 2004 17:05:27 -0400
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
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On Fri, 09 Jul 2004 20:37:18 -0000, "Christopher L. Morrow" said:
> all still dependent on the 'its hijackable' to begin with, right? So what
> changed really?
"Hmm... that phone call 2 hours ago sounded fishy.. I better re-double-check"
Working scam for 1 hour 50 minutes with 5 minute updates, good chance
of being stopped before deployment with 12 hour updates.
Yes, on the flip side, the hijacking is *stopped* sooner - but for many
classes of attacks that involve control of a nameserver, a few minutes
can be enough....
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