[71710] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: S.2281 Hearing (was: Justice Dept: Wiretaps...)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Christopher L. Morrow)
Mon Jun 21 15:36:01 2004
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 2004 19:32:07 +0000 (GMT)
From: "Christopher L. Morrow" <christopher.morrow@mci.com>
In-reply-to: <00ab01c457bf$d6bb0f90$8501a442@dasboot>
To: Pete Schroebel <crossfire@smsonline.net>
Cc: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>, John Curran <jcurran@istaff.org>,
nanog@merit.edu
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
On Mon, 21 Jun 2004, Pete Schroebel wrote:
>
>
> > > I think the only advantage to DOJ working this hard on LI capabilities
> is that
> > >it may raise public awareness of the issue, and, may help get better
> cryptographic
> > >technologies more widely deployed sooner. Other than that, I think it's
> just a lose
> > >all the way around.
> >
> > I'm not advocating the DoJ's position on this matter, just trying to
> > clarify it for the list (since it was rather muddled in earlier postings).
> >
> > /John
> >
>
>
> They, "the DOJ" is just trying to do it's job, as they are under the
> microscope due to the fumbles that led to the compromises by an obviously
> inept predecessor. Now, they are tighten the screws on everything from
> telecoms to bank accounts; to prevent another round of fumbled information
> resulting in a preventable issue going unchecked.
If you mean the 'misplaced' information surrounding the 9/11 hijackers,
I'm not sure any amount of wiretapping/snooping would have ever changed
the situation. The problem was more related to, according to news reports
and senate (house?) hearings/testimony, miscommunications inside each of
the parts of the DoJ/CIA/NSA. All the wiretapping in the world wont get
information passed correctly inside these organizations.
Smoke screen efforts are less helpful and are simple diversions from the
reality of the problem.
