[60989] in North American Network Operators' Group

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RE: Navy Marine Corps Internet hit

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Scott Weeks)
Wed Aug 20 16:39:56 2003

Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2003 10:39:16 -1000 (HST)
From: Scott Weeks <surfer@mauigateway.com>
To: "McBurnett, Jim" <jmcburnett@msmgmt.com>
Cc: Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com>, <vern@ee.lbl.gov>,
	<nanog@merit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <9BF6F06C4BC90746ADD6806746492A332AEDD4@msmmail01.msmgmt.com>
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu




On Wed, 20 Aug 2003, McBurnett, Jim wrote:

: -It sounds like a "turnkey" operation, with EDS managing everything.  They
: -may have 100,000 users with identical configurations (software, patch
: -levels, etc) in one big flat network.  A large homogeneous population is
: -vulnerable to a common infection.  Nachia has a very effecient scanning
: -and infection process, particularly if your entire network uses RFC1918
: -address space internally.
:
: As a former Marine, and IT support staff member..
: The Military uses REAL WORLD IP's on ALL systems.
: I won't mention IP's. BUT they have all RW on every system.
: Not quite a flat net either...
: It is rather a unique system, to say the least.....


Do you know if they segment the network into the zones I spoke of?  Why
would they be so ravaged as to have a network which could "become so
congested by worm traffic it can not be used for useful work" if the
security was in place at the ingress/egress of each security area?
Special policy that wouldn't allow proper technological solutions?

scott



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