[59838] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu)
Tue Jul 22 17:54:08 2003
To: alex@yuriev.com
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:51:20 EDT."
<Pine.LNX.4.10.10307221750360.12930-100000@s1.yuriev.com>
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:53:45 -0400
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
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On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:51:20 EDT, alex@yuriev.com said:
> I guess all folks with Ph.D. at Akamai really are paid for nothing if a
> virus could calculate that with a few traceroutes.
It's actually pretty easy if you get 20K distributed zombies doing the traceroutes
and then distributing the data to each other. Given that data, it's pretty easy to
compute the graph - every router running BGP has to do similar. :)
The Akamai problem is how to do it *without* having 20K boxes doing traceroutes. ;)
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