[59834] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steve)
Tue Jul 22 17:06:13 2003
From: Steve <sweaver@aquaria.org>
To: JAustad@temgweb.com (Austad, Jay)
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 16:04:31 -0500 (CDT)
Cc: alex@yuriev.com ('alex@yuriev.com'),
JAustad@temgweb.com (Austad Jay), nanog@merit.edu
In-Reply-To: <288FAF5565A1A74EA5E35C39E7EE1D42077FE20B@mail.temgweb.com> from "Austad, Jay" at Jul 22, 2003 04:00:22 PM
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
Just a handful of traceroutes would give it enough information to start
at a major backbone and work back towards itself.
-SW
> It could poll different looking glasses...
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: alex@yuriev.com [mailto:alex@yuriev.com]
> > Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2003 4:01 PM
> > To: Austad, Jay
> > Cc: nanog@merit.edu
> > Subject: RE: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques
> >
> >
> > > I was thinking about this the other day. The most
> > efficient way to make
> > > this work would be to spread using some vulnerability (like
> > the Microsoft
> > > DCOM vulnerability released last week), and then at a
> > predetermined time,
> > > start DoS'ing routers in the IP space of major providers,
> > and then work your
> > > way towards the "edges."
> >
> > Pray tell, the virus will also get BGP feeds to determine
> > where the edges
> > are?
> >
> > Alex
> >
> >
>
