[59596] in North American Network Operators' Group

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Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Peter Galbavy)
Thu Jul 10 04:32:58 2003

From: "Peter Galbavy" <peter.galbavy@knowtion.net>
To: "Gil Levi" <glevi@lynxpn.com>, <nanog@merit.edu>
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 09:31:17 +0100
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu


Gil Levi wrote:
> While it is impossible to stop someone (a terrorist) from cutting
> fiber, it is possible to limit his ability to do damage. It is
> possible to create alternative routes to be used in such cases. Then
> while the primary route may be down, the alternate route will be used
> and no terrorist should be able to locate the alternative route since
> this is something known only to the telecom carrier and is definitely
> not public knowledge. While this is not new to anyone, what is new is

I am sure you have direct experience of networks that work like this. I have
direct experience of the opposite. I am sure there is a whole bell curve
distribution from bad to good - and sadly the point the bell curve tries to
make it that most occurances are in the middle...

Peter


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