[59590] in North American Network Operators' Group
RE: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Vandy Hamidi)
Wed Jul 9 20:02:49 2003
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2003 17:01:12 -0700
From: "Vandy Hamidi" <vandy.hamidi@markettools.com>
To: "Eric Kuhnke" <eric@fnordsystems.com>, <nanog@merit.edu>
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
http://www.thebunker.net/
-----Original Message-----
From: Eric Kuhnke [mailto:eric@fnordsystems.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2003 3:48 PM
To: nanog@merit.edu
Subject: Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
I recall reading, last year, about a "Cyber Bunker" outside London UK =
which is being offered as colo to major banks. The banks were raving =
praise about it. This facility is an ex-RAF centralized radar control =
site, buried dozens of feet underground w/ thick concrete and designed =
to withstand nuclear weapon overpressure. Blast doors, EMF shielding, =
dual-redundant air filtered generators, the works.
The people who bought it and turned it into a colo neglected to mention =
one thing: It's in the middle of a farm field with a single homed fiber =
route to Telehouse Docklands.=20
Anyone have a backhoe? *snip*
DIVERSE ROUTES, people!
At 05:30 PM 7/9/2003 +0100, you wrote:
>Michael.Dillon@radianz.com wrote:
>> However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it
>> is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack.
>> If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an
>> increased probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and
>> one or more of their targets will escape total destruction.
>
>I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and
>rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another
>location in minutes. No amount of diversity could defend against a =
concerted
>attack like that unless you start installing very special low-level =
routes
>away from street level into many many buildings. Maybe you guys in the =
US
>are historically more paranoid, but London is just covered in single =
points
>of major failure for telecoms.
>
>Protecting the switching centres (IP or voice) looks great, but walk a =
few
>hundred feet and all senblence of physical security breaks.
>
>Peter
