[58031] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: The in-your-face hijacking example, was: Re: Who is announcing
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Sean Donelan)
Tue Apr 29 15:24:16 2003
Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2003 15:23:47 -0400 (EDT)
From: Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com>
To: kai@pac-rim.net
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
In-Reply-To: <124239451603.20030429141436@conti.nu>
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
On Tue, 29 Apr 2003 kai@pac-rim.net wrote:
> On 4/29/2003 at 3:10 AM, Sean Donelan wrote on NANOG-L:
> > So which ISPs are confused? Bogon's don't spontaneously occur in
> > BGP. Some ASN must originate them, and ASNs must pass them to
> > other ASNs. BGP helpfully includes the ASNs in the path.
>
> > What should be done about ASNs which repeatedly announce false or
> > unauthorized routes?
>
> Like: AS 15188 (rogue) ?
It appears this AS is on the tail of
7018 10910 12124 15188
701 10910 12124 15188
AT&T (7018)
InterNAP (10910)
Thorn.net (12124)
UUNET (701)
Who isn't filtering?
