[5766] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Incentive for route stabilty
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jeremy Porter)
Sat Oct 26 17:03:42 1996
To: Scott Mace <smace@crash.ops.neosoft.com>
cc: nanog@merit.edu
In-reply-to: Your message of "Sat, 26 Oct 1996 00:27:32 CDT."
<199610260527.AAA08813@crash.ops.neosoft.com>
Date: Sat, 26 Oct 1996 15:59:37 -0500
From: Jeremy Porter <jerry@fc.net>
In message <199610260527.AAA08813@crash.ops.neosoft.com>, Scott Mace writes:
>Here's an idea that just popped into my head after NANOG.
>
>Lets assume for a moment that the majority of route instabilty is
>coming from inexperienced providers. With that assumption in hand
>I propose the following incentive:
>
>Finanical compensation for bgp dampening policies.
>
>Deep pockets = very little flap penalty
>Shallow pockets = very heavy flap penalty
>
>Also, make the assumption that inexperienced providers arn't going
>to be able to pay for light flap penalties. So their only choice
>is to be stable or die.
>
>I havn't thought about how or where such a policy would be applied,
>but the underlying idea would help fix the problem of routing instabilty.
>
>I know this one is out there, but I just thought I'd mention it.
Fix it in the peering agreements.
Settlements based on flap!
:)
(only half joking)
---
Jeremy Porter, Freeside Communications, Inc. jerry@fc.net
PO BOX 80315 Austin, Tx 78708 | 1-800-968-8750 | 512-458-9810
http://www.fc.net
