[54784] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Is there a line of defense against Distributed Reflective attacks?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Brad Laue)
Thu Jan 16 23:20:40 2003
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2003 23:20:13 -0500
From: Brad Laue <brad@brad-x.com>
To: "Christopher L. Morrow" <chris@UU.NET>
Cc: hc <haesu@towardex.com>, nanog@merit.edu
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Jan 2003, hc wrote:
>
>
>>>
>>>
>>>Because syn cookies are available on routing gear??? Either way syn
>>>cookies are not going to keep the device from sending a 'syn-ack' to the
>>>'originating host'.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>True.. At least it will have some stop in the amount of attacks.
>>
>>It is quite unfortunate that it is impossible to control the 'ingress'
>>point of attack flow. Whenever there is a DoS attack, the only way to
>>drop it is to null route it (the method you have devised) over BGP
>>peering, but that knocks the victim host off the 'net... :-(
>>
>
>
> Sure, but this like all other attacks of this sort can be tracked... and
> so the pain is over /quickly/ provided you can track it quickly :) Also,
> sometimes null routes are ok.
How quickly is quickly? Often times as has been my recent experience
(part of my motivation for posting this thread) the flood is over before
one can get a human being on the phone.
What kinds of mechanisms exist for keeping track of the origins of
something of this nature?
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