[54764] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Scaled Back Cybersecurity
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Daniel Senie)
Wed Jan 15 12:50:58 2003
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2003 12:49:59 -0500
To: nanog@merit.edu
From: Daniel Senie <dts@senie.com>
In-Reply-To: <20030115173151.58112.14781.tmda@freedman.net>
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
At 12:31 PM 1/15/2003, Avi Freedman wrote:
> > > - Starting at the core, which is who the Feds buy the most IP from,
> > > still makes life a lot simpler if and when we get the "big one"
> > > in terms of cyber-attack.
> >
> > Is not the problem with this that few if any attacks originate in the
> > core, and by the time the traffics start getting aggregated there it is
> > already more or less to late?
> >
> > - kurtis -
>
>I'm getting at attacks *on* the core as something we need to be
>concerned about...
If protecting the core includes protecting the core from further at the
edges, then the folks running core components need to require those who
connect to them to implement such protection (ingress filtering and
whatever other measures are deemed helpful).
There's some precedent for this type of edict. Some years ago UUNet
mandated anyone using their dialups MUST implement port 25 filter configs
in their Radius servers.
Sure seems like a better thing for the core operators to do than throw
their hands in the air and say "it's someone else's problem."
