[51013] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Echo
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Brad Knowles)
Sun Aug 18 15:07:07 2002
In-Reply-To: <a05111b1ab98470990872@[10.0.1.60]>
Date: Sun, 18 Aug 2002 00:16:09 +0200
To: Brad Knowles <brad.knowles@skynet.be>,
"Karsten W. Rohrbach" <karsten@rohrbach.de>
From: Brad Knowles <brad.knowles@skynet.be>
Cc: Martin Hannigan <hannigan@fugawi.net>, nanog@merit.edu
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
At 11:36 PM +0200 2002/08/17, Brad Knowles wrote:
>> a very logical
>> algorithm would be ``n source ip adresses per /16 per minute'' which
>> would catch at least the badly distributed DDoS attacks and does not
>> impose large processing overhead in cycles and memory, i think.
>
> Assuming you're talking about the transmitting relay (which would
> be difficult to fake), this would be some additional protection.
Of course, it now occurs to me that there are plenty of providers
which may not own the entire /16 that they are in, and therefore they
could also get hurt by abuse being generated by near-by networks.
Unfortunately, I'm not sure that there's too much you can do about
this, because the consequences could be extremely severe.
> Unless someone is trying to DoS your machine. Heck, they could
> just generate zillions of SYN packets with random source IP
> addresses, and that could cause you some significant problems.
OTOH, this doesn't really have anything particular to do with the
service you'd be providing, and would not be any additional risk that
you would not already be experiencing.
--
Brad Knowles, <brad.knowles@skynet.be>
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."
-Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania.
GCS/IT d+(-) s:+(++)>: a C++(+++)$ UMBSHI++++$ P+>++ L+ !E W+++(--) N+ !w---
O- M++ V PS++(+++) PE- Y+(++) PGP>+++ t+(+++) 5++(+++) X++(+++) R+(+++)
tv+(+++) b+(++++) DI+(++++) D+(++) G+(++++) e++>++++ h--- r---(+++)* z(+++)
