[4826] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Peering versus Transit
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bill Woodcock)
Mon Sep 30 00:55:53 1996
Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 21:52:33 -0700 (PDT)
From: Bill Woodcock <woody@zocalo.net>
To: alan@mindvision.com
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
Alan Hannan (alan@mindvision.com) writes:
> I'm not Randy, but I did state the previous definition.
Yeah, I know, I was just particularly surprised by Randy's dismissive
attitude.
> B is utilizing A's transit resource in the manner
> A intended.
Purse snatchers utilize little old ladies' purses in the manner little
old ladies intend?
That's ascribing intention to A unreasonably. You appear to be saying
that if B is ill-intentioned enough to steal from A, that the fact of
A's existence legitimizes B's theft. Obviously, by this reasoning, A
would not exist if A didn't _intend_ to get ripped off by B. I find
this argument unconvincing.
> C is compensated by A to provide flow from B<->C<->A.
Again, I'd disagree. If A is buying transit from C, I'd suggest that
A's primary intention would be to utilize that transit to reach point
to which A is not already connected.
+---+ +---+
| A +---------+ B |
+---+ +---+
\ XP1 /
\ /
+---+
| C |
+---+
/ \
/ XP2 \
+---+ +---+
| D +---------+ E |
+---+ +---+
For instance, I'd argue that A would purchase transit
from C if A wished to exchange traffic with D and E, on XP2, to which
A isn't connected.
For A to reply to B's traffic through C is an expensive waste of A and
C's resources, not to mention a reduction in both speed and
reliability for both A and C's customers. Equally important is the
fact that neither A nor C have any way means of gaining recompense
from B for the expense and degredation of service which B is forcing
upon them.
Assuming A, B, and C are competitors, it's obviously to B's advantage
to practice exactly this sort of idiotic scheme, since it has no
immediate economic impact on B, yet the more B does it, the greater
the expense to A and C.
All the while, _all_ of the end users are experiencing a degredation
of overall quality of service and increased monthly charges.
So again, I ask how encouraging B to hose A and C's networks could be
construed as building a better Internet.
> C is rewarded for their compliance through an agreement with A.
So what does that have to do with B, and how does it legitimize B's
imposition at its sole discretion of an invented cost upon both A and
C?
I don't see a reward. Just a stick which ISPs which place a higher
value upon driving their competitors out of business than upon
providing stable service can use to do just that.
> It creates a better internet as A is encouraed to purchase QOS X
> from C
Excuse me? How is the Internet improved by A's unnecessarily adding
extra hops to both inbound and outbound traffic, passing higher costs
through from C to its customers, and putting an unnecessary load on
C's network?
> A wants to talk to B more than B wants to talk to A.
That's your original example, and the opposite of mine. However, I'd
say that that makes A a better ISP than B. Your argument leads to the
conclusion that the ISPs who try to provide the least connectivity
should be rewarded most highly, through highest profit margins.
That seems to me to be a socially undesirable end.
-Bill
________________________________________________________________________________
bill woodcock woody@zocalo.net woody@applelink.apple.com user@host.domain.com
