[42893] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Points of Failure (was Re: National infrastructure asset)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Sean Donelan)
Tue Sep 25 13:07:05 2001
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 13:19:19 -0400 (EDT)
From: Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com>
To: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
In-Reply-To: <200109242015.UAA02607@vacation.karoshi.com>
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On Mon, 24 Sep 2001 bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote:
> > > When 25 Broadway failed, approximately 1% of the global Internet
> > > routing table also disappeared. Which I would guess qualifies it
> From what point did 1% of the routing table disappear?
> Was the same visable from multiple, diverse points?
>
> I expect that from some perspectives, 100% of the routing
> table disappeared and some places didn't even see a blip.
The Internet as we know it is just a collective illusion.
You are correct from one side of the partion, 99% of the routes
disappeared and on the other side 1% of the routes disappeared.
I checked four different BGP feeds from a mix of providers, and
they were fairly consistent.
But percentage of routes is just one way to measure "importance."
It may not be the best way. Other methods include
1. Number of stock options owned by Very Important People
2. CAIDA skitter traces of routers of confluence
3. Number of OC-192 links in a building
4. Number of "Tier 1" providers in a building
5. Government fiat
6. Wait for the building to fall down and see what happens
Assuming there are locations more impotant than others, should
we do anything? Or should we just hope no one else figures out
where they are?
