[40113] in North American Network Operators' Group

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Re: Code Red growth stats

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (k claffy)
Wed Aug 1 22:07:10 2001

Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2001 19:06:27 -0700
From: k claffy <kc@ipn.caida.org>
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Message-ID: <20010801190627.A7553@caida.org>
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In-Reply-To: <20010801203622.C27D97B59@berkshire.research.att.com>; from smb@research.att.com on Wed, Aug 01, 2001 at 04:36:22PM -0400
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  >
  While they don't say, the "number of infected hosts" graph makes me 
  assume that they're counting unique IP addresses that tried to hit them.
  
  As I said, my numbers are consistent with others posted here.  And I've 
  gotten private mail about another, similar observation -- Code Red, 
  Round 2, appears to have peaked a few hours ago.
  
  		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb
  
  

hmm, not sure about that, smb.

albeit crippled caida monitor (we're working on it),
it does seem to have reversed slope again:
http://www.caida.org/analysis/security/code-red/aug1-live-hosts.gif

bunch of fascinating comparative data too,
like the number of internal addresses that
were infected during each attaack:

        Code-Red infected hosts with reserved IP addresses (attack 1)

        10.0.0.0/8:     203     172.16.0.0/12   70      192.168.0.0/16  177

        Code-Red infected hosts with reserved IP addresses (attack 2)

        10.0.0.0/8:     0       172.16.0.0/12   6       192.168.0.0/16  0


(nevermind that we shouldn't see such addresses
in the first place, we all know that's a myth --
but whoever is using them either fixed their
nat configs this time or patched..)


about .5GB/hour of data, we gonna be outta disk by morning,
wow, we've hit every measurement snag possible today,
elves are all beyond exhausted...

per-AS stats still processing,
haven't started a geographic analysis of this attack yet
(we'd like to see which states/countries had highest patch rate, 
not that geography matters in the least, 
that much has been demonstrated....)

k

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