[40029] in North American Network Operators' Group

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Re: telnet vs ssh on Core equipment , looking for reasons why ?

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (alex@yuriev.com)
Tue Jul 31 11:36:56 2001

Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2001 11:32:50 -0400 (EDT)
From: <alex@yuriev.com>
To: Greg Maxwell <gmaxwell@martin.fl.us>
Cc: "Stephen J. Wilcox" <steve@opaltelecom.co.uk>,
	fingers <fingers@fingers.co.za>,
	"Mr. James W. Laferriere" <babydr@baby-dragons.com>, nanog@merit.edu
In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.4.33.0107311128170.3912-100000@da1server.martin.fl.us>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1010731113202.29579V-100000@cathy.uuworld.com>
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Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu


> On Tue, 31 Jul 2001 alex@yuriev.com wrote:
> 
> > Monkey in the Middle attack on SSH is very difficult to perform. I'm cc'ing
> > Matt Bishop (bishop@cs.ucdavis.edu) who together with yours truly wrote a
> > paper on this in 1997.
> 
> Hard how? Are you talking about the complexity in coding the exploit app?
> So what! It only has to be written once:

Really? And does it work on all hosts, no matter how they are configured?
Next...

Alex

> 
> SSHv1
> wget http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/dsniff-2.3.tar.gz
> tar -zxf dsniff-2.3.tar.gz
> man ./dsniff-2.3/sshmitm.8
> 
> The SSH security model is fundimentally weak against Man in the Middle,
> because it provides no methodology to verify the transmitted key (beyond
> crude manual methods... Not that PKI system used with SSL is all that
> effective either).
> 
> 
> 
> 


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