[36190] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: dsl providers that will route /24
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu)
Thu Mar 29 18:44:22 2001
Message-Id: <200103292320.f2TNKEA13823@foo-bar-baz.cc.vt.edu>
To: David Schwartz <davids@webmaster.com>
Cc: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>, nanog@nanog.org
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 29 Mar 2001 15:08:24 PST."
<NCBBLIEPOCNJOAEKBEAKAEILOBAA.davids@webmaster.com>
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
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Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2001 18:20:14 -0500
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On Thu, 29 Mar 2001 15:08:24 PST, David Schwartz said:
> So long as spoofing is possible, you cannot be sure where an attack came
And spoofing is possible because people don't filter.
> from unless you can either log it at its source or trace the stream to its
> source. That's the problem, and filters don't fix that.
So we shouldn't filter at the source because we can't fix the problem unless
we're filtering at the source?
Or are you saying that because seat belts fail 1% of the time, we shouldn't
use them to help in the other 99% of the crashes?
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