[34975] in North American Network Operators' Group

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Re: rfc 1918

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jim Shankland)
Thu Feb 22 19:12:54 2001

Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2001 15:49:02 -0800
Message-Id: <200102222349.PAA15903@ndk.shankland.org>
From: Jim Shankland <nanog@shankland.org>
To: "Richard A. Steenbergen" <ras@e-gerbil.net>,
	Ariel Biener <ariel@fireball.tau.ac.il>, <nanog@merit.edu>
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu


Note that the proposition, "Providers should filter RFC1918-sourced
packets at the periphery" is a subset of the proposition, "Providers
should filter at the periphery packets with source addresses not
explicitly authorized by the provider."  I subscribe to the second
proposition, and hence implicitly to the former.  The problem is not
the stray RFC1918-sourced packet here or there.  The problem is that
the de facto standard is that you can inject packets with arbitrary
source addresses into the Internet from anywhere.  The number of
attacks that use spoofed source addresses is reason enough to change
this.

But I'm not holding my breath.

Jim Shankland


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