[33439] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: DNS requests from 209.67.50.203
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bora Akyol)
Wed Jan 10 23:41:13 2001
Message-ID: <010101c07b88$64e594b0$0500000a@DL100779>
From: "Bora Akyol" <akyol@akyol.org>
To: "Vern Paxson" <vern@ee.lbl.gov>
Cc: <nanog@merit.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2001 20:38:11 -0800
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Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
I am still curious as to why *this* attack would even exist (seeing that it
uses a spoofed source IP address) if people were filtering traffic that were
originationg from their networks properly.
I thought we discussed this already last month on the list.
Bora
----- Original Message -----
From: "Vern Paxson" <vern@ee.lbl.gov>
To: "Jared Mauch" <jared@puck.Nether.net>
Cc: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>;
<jtk@aharp.is-net.depaul.edu>; <nanog@merit.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2001 6:45 PM
Subject: Re: DNS requests from 209.67.50.203
>
> > A good way to reduce this is to turn off recursion for
> > people not on your network for your dns server. This is fairly easy
> > to do with bind8/bind9.
>
> The attack isn't via recursive lookups (though recursion could help
augment
> the attack). The reflection is in terms of the DNS reply to the purported
> requestor (really the victim). At lbl.gov, none of the requests result in
> further lookups from our nameserver. But the victim still receives the
reply
> stream, which from a combined large number of name servers is very large.
>
> See my draft paper
>
> ftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/.vp-reflectors.txt
>
> for a discussion of reflector attacks.
>
> Vern
>