[32364] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: ISPs as content-police or method-police
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu)
Mon Nov 20 11:56:49 2000
Message-Id: <200011201654.eAKGsXw27498@black-ice.cc.vt.edu>
To: Ehud Gavron <gavron@ACES.COM>
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 20 Nov 2000 09:21:10 MST."
<3A194F75.75925C0C@Wetwork.Net>
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
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Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2000 11:54:32 -0500
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On Mon, 20 Nov 2000 09:21:10 MST, Ehud Gavron said:
> It is clear (to me) that customers who get a connection
> to the net do NOT want that connection limited nor
> censored.
Unfortunately, it's NOT clear that this is the case. The average customer
just THINKS they want something. The question of whether it's something
actually reasonable to do is a different issue....
Remember - the *reason* this is a point worth discussing at *ALL* is because
such a large percentage of customers don't have a CLUE - if (for instance)
98% of the shops had enough clue to close down open shares, we'd not be seeing
so many scans for them.
I suspect that if a large percentage of Tier 1/2 carriers actually filtered
ports 137 through 139, we'd not be seeing anywhere near the amount of QAZ and
similar activity. And as has been pointed out, you can ALWAYS punch a hole
in the filter for customers who like to live risky, or they can find other
ways to tunnel their packets.
--
Valdis Kletnieks
Operating Systems Analyst
Virginia Tech
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