[30628] in North American Network Operators' Group
The last thing I'm gonna say about IRC
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Shawn McMahon)
Sun Aug 20 13:55:35 2000
Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2000 13:53:47 -0400
From: Shawn McMahon <smcmahon@eiv.com>
To: nanog@merit.edu
Message-ID: <20000820135347.C26108@eiv.com>
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In-Reply-To: <20000820104310.A24281@samurai.sfo.dead-dog.com>; from msa@samurai.sfo.dead-dog.com on Sun, Aug 20, 2000 at 10:43:10AM -0700
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On Sun, Aug 20, 2000 at 10:43:10AM -0700, Majdi S. Abbas wrote:
> > Hence, if all the IRC networks would implement Chanserv, and educate us=
ers,
> > these attacks would decrease.
>=20
> Actually, then they get directed at the services, their
> upstream hubs, etc. Trust me on this. As long as IRC is running
> in some way, shape, or form, you have a very big bullseye placed
> on your network.
I did say "decrease" not "stop entirely".
Every argument I'm getting thrown back at me is arguing against the latter,
instead of what I actually said.
If even one person doesn't attack because he can't take over the channel,
and brief service interruption doesn't cut the mustard for him, then using
Chanserv was a good tool, and that's the only claim I made.
If you want to argue that the attacks won't decrease, fine; but everybody
please stop telling me that they won't cease, because I KNOW THAT ALREADY.
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