[29803] in North American Network Operators' Group
RE: RBL-type BGP service for known rogue networks?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Kai Schlichting)
Fri Jul 7 11:32:59 2000
Message-Id: <4.3.2.7.2.20000707110910.03870460@mail.speedus.net>
Date: Fri, 07 Jul 2000 11:22:52 -0400
To: <nanog@merit.edu>
From: Kai Schlichting <kai@pac-rim.net>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.4.21.0007070327560.6480-100000@vellocet.insync.ne
t>
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At Friday 04:28 AM 7/7/00, Joe Shaw wrote:
>UUNet's abuse department used to be the same way, especially during the
>weekend. If you wanted to annoy the piss out of a UUNet dedicated line
>customer, the weekend was the time to do it. I don't know if that's
>changed now.
Winds are shifting. One of the original spam floods that trigggered the
creation of SpamShield, was from an Alternet dialup, and it took them
a mere 10 minutes to shut that account off. That must have been a different
department at the time:
Try being on the receiving end of a spoofed/randomized SYN/anything
flood that doesn't exceed, say: 1Mbps and doesn't load UUnet's network
so much. They won't even lift a damn finger and TRY to trace this back,
supposedly because they can't trace it back through their ATM PVCs
(an argument that has been backed up by other people I spoke to).
They will happily charge you for the traffic though.
A network design that doesn't allow tracing back spoofed traffic?
Way to go, UUnet.
And yes, I remember CenterTrack: http://www.nanog.org/mtg-9910/robert.html ,
it just wasn't in production at the time - and I have no idea if it was
ever deployed successfully.
Now, lets watch Vijay rush to the defense of his, uhm, stock options.
