[28457] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: ABOVE.NET SECURITY TRUTHS?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Danny McPherson)
Sun Apr 30 22:33:38 2000
Message-Id: <200005010837.CAA02950@tcb.net>
To: Philip Smith <pfs@cisco.com>
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
From: Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net>
Reply-To: danny@tcb.net
Date: Mon, 01 May 2000 02:37:14 -0600
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
> As you pointed out to Barry Greene and myself previously, the "aaa
> accounting" command as below will log commands typed in at "enable" level.
> So, if you are changing the onboard router password, yes, you will see the
> new password in your accounting logs, in clear text.
>
> However, I don't consider it good practice to keep any critical passwords
> on a router when an authentication mechanism such as TACACS+ is in place.
Unfornately, auth servers fail and you have to keep VTY and fallback
passwords locally configured on the router.
> Also, if I was modifying the onboard enable secret (last resort password
> when TACACS+ or Radius is configured) at any stage, I'd tftp-load the
> configuration from a remote server, not ever type it in live.
I don't see how this actually changes anything though, aren't tftp'd files
authorized (and therefore, logged) in a similar manner?
And as wonderful as it sounds, it's not always possible in real networks.
However, entering the encrypted *enable* password (w/level) would accommodate
this. Though, of course, the BGP TCP MD5 stuff and the VTY passwords (and
most other passwords) still don't support the ~non-reversible encryption
algorithm.
As for this entire thread, it's seems now to be more appropriate for cisco-nsp
or the like.
-danny