[27092] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Yahoo! Lessons Learned
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Dan Hollis)
Wed Feb 9 05:58:43 2000
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 02:56:51 -0800 (PST)
From: Dan Hollis <goemon@sasami.anime.net>
To: Vadim Antonov <avg@kotovnik.com>
Cc: dts@senie.com, nanog@nanog.org
In-Reply-To: <200002090726.XAA08147@kitty.kotovnik.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.10.10002090248340.25075-100000@anime.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
On Tue, 8 Feb 2000, Vadim Antonov wrote:
> The DoS prevention functions (not letting directed bcast in, and not letting
> forged addresses out) should be done at provider's side.
Unfortunately I suspect its going to take some high profile lawsuits
before this gets widely enough deployed by providers to be effective.
There just isnt the financial incentive for providers to be bothered with
it, so its going to have to end up being a legal liability if they dont,
before they will take action.
Really, I think things like RPF and other *basic* filters should be a
contractual requirement before allowing customers to connect to the
network. Hell, im thinking Cisco and others should make it a *default*. ;)
-Dan
