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Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Rod Beck)
Thu Jun 1 15:44:18 2017

X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
From: Rod Beck <rod.beck@unitedcablecompany.com>
To: Eric Kuhnke <eric.kuhnke@gmail.com>, "nanog@nanog.org list"
 <nanog@nanog.org>
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2017 19:44:12 +0000
In-Reply-To: <CAB69EHhCcdaE0Yp1DgJ6n11V8+XFNs1dFkLdvGR_vBFDrkg42g@mail.gmail.com>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org

As someone who has sold a lot of capacity on Hibernia Atlantic, I must conc=
ur. There is a website showing where most of the Trans-Atlantic cables land=
 on the West Coast of Britain at towns like Bude in Wales. Hiding is not an=
 option.


http://www.kis-orca.eu/


Regards,


Roderick.



________________________________
From: NANOG <nanog-bounces@nanog.org> on behalf of Eric Kuhnke <eric.kuhnke=
@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, June 1, 2017 9:20 PM
To: nanog@nanog.org list
Subject: Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables

It's not like the locations of any of the transatlantic or transpacific
cable landing stations are a big secret. They're published in the FCC's
digest reports for international authorization and whenever ownership of a
cable changes hands or is restructured.

Additionally it is pretty hard to hide from modern imagery intelligence
analysis any sort of building that has 1+1 or N+1 200kW diesel generators
and the cooling required for a medium sized telecom facility.

Locations of cables are published specifically for the purpose of helping
trawlers and ships avoid damaging them, for example:
http://bandoncable.org/cables.asp
[http://bandoncable.org/images/cable01.jpg]<http://bandoncable.org/cables.a=
sp>

Bandon Submarine Cable Council - Cable Locations<http://bandoncable.org/cab=
les.asp>
bandoncable.org
Be advised of the location if two submarine cables in the North Pacific loc=
ated off the coast of Bandon, Oregon. The TPC-5 cable system consists of ..=
.



That said, a pretty quick way to get on some homeland security watch lists
would be to hang around a cable landing station beach location with a big
DSLR camera, and appear uninterested in the beach...




On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 11:02 AM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:

>
> There must be a perfectly logical explanation....  Yes, people in the
> industry know where the choke points are. But the choke points aren't
> always the most obvious places. Its kinda a weird for diplomats to show u=
p
> there.
>
> On the other hand, I've been a fiber optic tourist.  I've visited many
> critical choke points in the USA and other countries, and even took selfi=
es
> :-)
>
>
> http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/russia-spies-espion
> age-trump-239003
>
> In the throes of the 2016 campaign, the FBI found itself with an
> escalating problem: Russian diplomats, whose travel was supposed to be
> tracked by the State Department, were going missing.
>
> The diplomats, widely assumed to be intelligence operatives, would
> eventually turn up in odd places, often in middle-of-nowhere USA. One was
> found on a beach, nowhere near where he was supposed to be. In one
> particularly bizarre case, relayed by a U.S. intelligence official, anoth=
er
> turned up wandering around in the middle of the desert. Interestingly, bo=
th
> seemed to be lingering where underground fiber-optic cables tend to run.
>
> According to another U.S. intelligence official, =93They find these guys
> driving around in circles in Kansas. It=92s a pretty aggressive effort.=
=94
>
> It=92s a trend that has led intelligence officials to conclude that the
> Kremlin is waging a quiet effort to map the United States=92
> telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps preparing for an opportunity t=
o
> disrupt it.
>

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