[193726] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: backbones filtering unsanctioned sites
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Baldur Norddahl)
Thu Feb 16 19:19:25 2017
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
To: nanog@nanog.org
From: Baldur Norddahl <baldur.norddahl@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2017 01:06:52 +0100
In-Reply-To: <58A61126.6000209@vaxination.ca>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
For transit maybe Cogent should have dropped the route, so they did not
advertize a route to peers that included null routed parts.
Den 16/02/2017 kl. 21.52 skrev Jean-Francois Mezei:
> On 2017-02-16 14:59, Sadiq Saif wrote:
>
>> From -
>> https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/02/a-court-order-blocked-pirate-sites-that-werent-supposed-to-be-blocked/
>
> Many thanks.
>
> pardon my ignorance here, but question:
>
> For an outfit such as Cogent which acts not only as a transit provider,
> but also edge provider to large end users, can it easily implement such
> a court order to block only edge interfaces and not to its transit
> infrastructure?
>
> (aka: propagate null routes for 104.31.19.30 only to interfaces that
> lead to end users, but leave core/GBP aspects without the block.)
>
> Or is BGP and any internal routing protocols so intermingled that it
> becomes hard to manage such blocks ?
>
> The difficulty for network to block traffic becomes an important
> argument when trying to convince governments that blocking should not be
> done. (ex: Québec government wanting to block access to gambling sites
> except its own).
>
