[191668] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (John Kristoff)
Sun Sep 25 13:00:25 2016
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 12:00:21 -0500
From: John Kristoff <jtk@depaul.edu>
To: nanog@nanog.org
In-Reply-To: <235cdefe042147e4a14be955177c2e70@XCASPRD01-DFT.dpu.depaul.edu>
Reply-To: jtk@aharp.iorc.depaul.edu
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
On Sun, 25 Sep 2016 14:36:18 +0000
Ca By <cb.list6@gmail.com> wrote:
> As long as their is one spoof capable network on the net, the problem will
> not be solved.
This is not strictly true. If it could be determined where a large
bulk of the spoofing came from, public pressure could be applied. This
may not have been the issue in this case, but in many amplification and
reflection attacks, the originating spoof-enabled networks were from a
limited set of networks. De-peering, service termination, shaming, etc
could have an effect.
John
