[191533] in North American Network Operators' Group

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Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking?

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Hugo Slabbert)
Tue Sep 20 21:46:06 2016

X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 18:46:01 -0700
From: Hugo Slabbert <hugo@slabnet.com>
To: Tom Beecher <beecher@beecher.cc>
In-Reply-To: <CAL9Qcx7qjR4zePOGf4VxnnVgDK-ShmBEb+Ud56AK7rJazi3LsA@mail.gmail.com>
Cc: NANOG <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org


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Lucy, you got some (*serious*) 'splainin to do...

http://research.dyn.com/2016/09/backconnects-suspicious-bgp-hijacks/
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/ddos-mitigation-firm-has-history-of-hija=
cks/

--=20
Hugo Slabbert       | email, xmpp/jabber: hugo@slabnet.com
pgp key: B178313E   | also on Signal

On Sun 2016-Sep-18 22:25:44 -0400, Tom Beecher <beecher@beecher.cc> wrote:

>So after reading your explanation of things...
>
>Your technical protections for your client proved sufficient to handle the
>attack. You took OFFENSIVE action by hijacking the IP space. By your own
>statements, it was only in response to threats against your company. You
>were no longer providing DDoS protection to a client. You were exacting a
>vendetta against someone who was being MEAN to you. Even if that person
>probably deserved it, you still cannot do what was done.
>
>I appreciate the desire to want to protect friends and family from
>anonymous threats, and also realize how ill equipped law enforcement
>usually is while something like this is occurring.
>
>However, in my view, by taking the action you did, you have shown your
>company isn't ready to be operating in the security space. Being threatened
>by bad actors is a nominal part of doing business in the security space.
>Unfortunately you didn't handle it well, and I think that will stick to you
>for a long time.
>
>On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Bryant Townsend <bryant@backconnect.com>
>wrote:
>
>> @ca & Matt - No, we do not plan to ever intentionally perform a
>> non-authorized BGP hijack in the future.
>>
>> @Steve - Correct, the attack had already been mitigated. The decision to
>> hijack the attackers IP space was to deal with their threats, which if
>> carried through could have potentially lead to physical harm. Although t=
he
>> hijack gave us a unique insight into the attackers services, it was not a
>> factor that influenced my decision.
>>
>> @Blake & Mel - We will likely cover some of these questions in a future
>> blog post.
>>

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