[191430] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Mel Beckman)
Wed Sep 14 10:51:58 2016
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
From: Mel Beckman <mel@beckman.org>
To: "surfer@mauigateway.com" <surfer@mauigateway.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 14:51:53 +0000
In-Reply-To: <20160914000951.CCA9D8C7@m0086238.ppops.net>
Cc: "nanog@nanog.org" <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
Scott and Doug,
The problem with a new automated enforcement system is that it hobbles both=
agility and innovation. ISPs have enjoyed simple BGP management, entirely =
self-regulated, for decades. A global enforcement system, besides being dan=
g hard to do correctly, brings the specter of government interference, sinc=
e such a system could be overtaken by government entities to manhandle free=
speech.=20
In my opinion, the community hasn't spent nearly enough time discussing the=
danger aspect. Being engineers, we focus on technical means, ignoring the =
fact that we're designing our own guillotine.=20
-mel beckman
> On Sep 14, 2016, at 12:10 AM, Scott Weeks <surfer@mauigateway.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --- dougm.work@gmail.com wrote:
> From: Doug Montgomery <dougm.work@gmail.com>
>=20
> If only there were a global system, with consistent and verifiable securi=
ty
> properties, to permit address holders to declare the set of AS's authoriz=
ed
> to announce their prefixes, and routers anywhere on the Internet to
> independently verify the corresponding validity of received announcements=
.
>=20
> *cough https://www.nanog.org/meetings/abstract?id=3D2846 cough*
> ------------------------------------------------
>=20
>=20
> Yes, RPKI. That's what I was waiting for. Now we can get to
> a real discussion... ;-)
>=20
> scott
