[191392] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jean-Francois Mezei)
Mon Sep 12 15:42:06 2016
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
From: Jean-Francois Mezei <jfmezei_nanog@vaxination.ca>
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 15:42:02 -0400
In-Reply-To: <5447.1473704126@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
On 2016-09-12 14:15, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> I don't see "hijacking" in your description of the iStop case - it appears
> to have been fully coordinated and with permission.
While I am not sure about fully coordinated and with permission, it is
an example where it was a desirable outcome to maintain service to
customers who would otherwise have have been left without service.
I pointed this as an example where "highjacking" can sometimes be
desirable. An automated system would likekely block such announcements
from ISP3 about ISP1's IP blocks pointing to ISP2's routers as it could
be seen as highly suspect.
Then again, with many mergers and acquisitions, this type or arrangement
may be common as acquiring ISP1 may start to make BGP announcements of
ISP2's IPs before those IPs have had time to be transfered.
