[180411] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Routing Insecurity (Re: BGP in the Washington Post)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Roland Dobbins)
Tue Jun 2 05:01:54 2015
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
From: "Roland Dobbins" <rdobbins@arbor.net>
To: nanog@nanog.org
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 16:01:40 +0700
In-Reply-To: <20150602084632.GB3772@belenos>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
On 2 Jun 2015, at 15:46, Denis Fondras wrote:
> Everyone is managing its own routing policy, not everyone is managing
> its own DNS root.
Everyone CAN manage his own DNS root; everyone CAN use /etc/hosts;
everyone CAN switch to an altogether different name resolution such as
PNRP.
Everyone CAN'T switch to an alternate global routing table.
So, what happens when the authorities in some locale start pressing for
the cancellation of relevant certificates utilized in routing PKI,
and/or order operators under their jurisdiction to reject same?
-----------------------------------
Roland Dobbins <rdobbins@arbor.net>
