[177287] in North American Network Operators' Group

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Re: DDOS solution recommendation

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Mike Hammett)
Sun Jan 11 16:22:42 2015

X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2015 15:22:30 -0600 (CST)
From: Mike Hammett <nanog@ics-il.net>
To: NANOG list <nanog@nanog.org>
In-Reply-To: <28333B30-49A1-476D-AABA-8731E2DBCFB0@ianai.net>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org

I know that UDP can be spoofed, but it's not likely that the SSH, mail, etc=
. login attempts, web page hits, etc. would be spoofed as they'd have to kn=
ow the response to be of any good.=20

There's more going on than UDP spoofing\amplification. Frankly the most dam=
aging thing to me has been SMTP hijacking. For you to login to my SMTP serv=
er and send e-mail out, there's going to be one hell of a conversation goin=
g on.=20

However, the thought is that if someone's PC is hijacked and trying to logi=
n to my SMTP server, it'll be doing something else later (or even concurren=
tly). Enough deployment (in addition to BCP 38), and most of the threats ar=
e mitigated.=20




-----=20
Mike Hammett=20
Intelligent Computing Solutions=20
http://www.ics-il.com=20



----- Original Message -----

From: "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick@ianai.net>=20
To: "NANOG list" <nanog@nanog.org>=20
Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2015 3:14:27 PM=20
Subject: Re: DDOS solution recommendation=20

You are very confused about how the Internet works.=20

Or did you not understand the words "with source of"?=20

Wait, maybe you have some magic to tell the actual source of a packet than =
the 32/128 bits in the "source" field? Because if you do, you stand to make=
 a few billion dollars, and I'll be one of the first to pay you for it. (I'=
m specifically excluding things that give hints like TTL & incoming interfa=
ce. To get paid, you need to tell me the ACTUAL source of a spoofed packet.=
)=20

While I will admit I do not know which of the above is true, my money is on=
 #1.=20

--=20
TTFN,=20
patrick=20

> On Jan 11, 2015, at 16:08 , Mike Hammett <nanog@ics-il.net> wrote:=20
>=20
> If that were to happen, it'd be for 30 days and it'd be whatever random r=
esidential account or APNIC address that was doing it. Not really a big los=
s.=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----=20
> Mike Hammett=20
> Intelligent Computing Solutions=20
> http://www.ics-il.com=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> ----- Original Message -----=20
>=20
> From: "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick@ianai.net>=20
> To: "NANOG list" <nanog@nanog.org>=20
> Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2015 1:42:13 PM=20
> Subject: Re: DDOS solution recommendation=20
>=20
> I do love solutions which open larger attack surfaces than they are suppo=
sed to close. In the US, we call that "a cure worse than the disease".=20
>=20
> Send packet from random bot with source of Google, Comcast, Akamai, etc. =
to Mr. Hammett's not-DNS / honeypot / whatever, and watch him close himself=
 off from the world.=20
>=20
> Voil=C3=A0! Denial of service accomplished without all the hassle of send=
ing 100s of Gbps of traffic.=20
>=20
> Best part is he was willing to explain this to 10,000+ of his not-so-clos=
est friends, in a search-engine-indexed manner.=20
>=20
> --=20
> TTFN,=20
> patrick=20
>=20
> On Jan 11, 2015, at 14:34 , Phil Bedard <bedard.phil@gmail.com> wrote:=20
>>=20
>> Many attacks can use spoofed source IPs, so who are you really blocking?=
=20
>>=20
>> That's why BCP38 as mentioned many times already is a necessary tool in=
=20
>> fighting the attacks overall.=20
>>=20
>> Phil=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 1/11/15, 4:33 PM, "Mike Hammett" <nanog@ics-il.net> wrote:=20
>>=20
>>> I didn't necessarily think I was shattering minds with my ideas.=20
>>>=20
>>> I don't have the time to read a dozen presentations.=20
>>>=20
>>> Blackhole them and move on. I don't care whose feelings I hurt. This=20
>>> isn't kindergarten. Maybe "you" should have tried a little harder to no=
t=20
>>> get a virus in the first place. Quit clicking on male enhancement ads o=
r=20
>>> update your OS occasionally. I'm not going to spend a bunch of time and=
=20
>>> money to make sure someone's bubble of bliss doesn't get popped. Swift,=
=20
>>> effective, cheap. Besides, you're only cut off for 30 days. If in 30 da=
ys=20
>>> you can prove yourself to be responsible, we can try this again. Well,=
=20
>>> that or a sufficient support request.=20
>>>=20
>>> Besides, if enough people did hat, the list of blackholes wouldn't be=
=20
>>> huge as someone upstream already blocked them.=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> -----=20
>>> Mike Hammett=20
>>> Intelligent Computing Solutions=20
>>> http://www.ics-il.com=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> ----- Original Message -----=20
>>>=20
>>> From: "Roland Dobbins" <rdobbins@arbor.net>=20
>>> To: nanog@nanog.org=20
>>> Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2015 9:29:33 AM=20
>>> Subject: Re: DDOS solution recommendation=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On 11 Jan 2015, at 22:21, Mike Hammett wrote:=20
>>>=20
>>>> I'm not saying what you're doing is wrong, I'm saying whatever the=20
>>>> industry as a whole is doing obviously isn't working and perhaps a=20
>>>> different approach is required.=20
>>>=20
>>> You haven't recommended anything new, and you really need to do some=20
>>> reading in order to understand why it isn't as simple as you seem to=20
>>> think it is.=20
>>>=20
>>>> Security teams? My network has me, myself and I.=20
>>>=20
>>> And a relatively small network, too.=20
>>>=20
>>>> If for example ChinaNet's abuse department isn't doing anything about=
=20
>>>> complains, eventually their whole network gets blocked a /32 at a=20
>>>> time. *shrugs* Their loss.=20
>>>=20
>>> Again, it isn't that simple.=20
>>>=20
>>> -----------------------------------=20
>>> Roland Dobbins <rdobbins@arbor.net>=20
>>>=20
>=20



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