[176469] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Low-numbered ASes being hijacked? [Re: BGP Update Report]
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Paul S.)
Sun Nov 30 10:53:21 2014
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
Date: Mon, 01 Dec 2014 00:53:07 +0900
From: "Paul S." <contact@winterei.se>
To: nanog@nanog.org
In-Reply-To: <877fyc4vi4.fsf@snoopy.tippete.net>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
On 11/30/2014 午後 11:24, Pierfrancesco Caci wrote:
>>>>>> "Simon" == Simon Leinen <simon.leinen@switch.ch> writes:
> Simon> Some suspicious paths I'm seeing right now:
>
> Simon> 133439 5
> Simon> 197945 4
>
> my bet is on someone using the syntax "prepend asnX timesY" on a router
> that instead wants "prepend asnX asnX...."
>
