[175177] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Unwanted Traffic Removal Service (UTRS)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Hank Nussbacher)
Fri Oct 10 02:49:57 2014
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 09:49:39 +0300
To: Christian Seitz <chris@in-berlin.de>,nanog@nanog.org
From: Hank Nussbacher <hank@efes.iucc.ac.il>
In-Reply-To: <5436F6DD.1080100@in-berlin.de>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
At 22:58 09/10/2014 +0200, Christian Seitz wrote:
>Allowing ASN to blackhole a prefix based on AS sets is dangerous from my point
>of view. In the RIPE database you can add any AS to your AS set without
>verification. Ok, it doesn't make much difference because most IP transit
>providers also filter on the AS set, but a worldwide announced /24 prefix is
>much more visible than a /32 blackhole route that is only announced to the
>participants.
See:
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/2014-June/002696.html
-Hank
