[174810] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: large BCP38 compliance testing
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Andrei Robachevsky)
Thu Oct 2 11:32:04 2014
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 17:31:43 +0200
From: Andrei Robachevsky <robachevsky@isoc.org>
To: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>, Mikael Abrahamsson <swmike@swm.pp.se>,
<nanog@nanog.org>
In-Reply-To: <542D28CE.9070505@foobar.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
Nick Hilliard wrote on 02/10/14 12:28:
> This shouldn't stop us from finding, then naming and shaming operators
> who don't use bcp38, but we also need to maintain realistic expectations
> about how successful it's going to be.
This feels indeed like boiling the ocean, but what are the alternatives,
given that we are looking at a fundamental feature in the Internet
routing system - source address has no practical significance?
But on another side, how easy it is to comply? The best documentation I
found was “RIPE Anti-Spoofing Task Force HOW-TO”,
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-431, but even that doesn't cover all
cases and needs updating.
Are there are other useful references, besides bcp38/84 and bcp38.info?
Andrei
