[173565] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Richard Bennett, NANOG posting, and Integrity
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Dorian Kim)
Mon Jul 28 13:07:26 2014
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
From: Dorian Kim <dorian@blackrose.org>
In-Reply-To: <6AFAF602-5E95-4FAC-90C3-1247EA8DF385@pch.net>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 13:04:57 -0400
To: Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net>
Cc: North American Network Operators Group <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
On Jul 28, 2014, at 12:36 PM, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net> wrote:
>=20
> On Jul 28, 2014, at 9:28 AM, William Herrin <bill@herrin.us> wrote:
>> The data set suffers three flaws:
>=20
> Depending on your point of view, a lot more than three, undoubtedly.
>=20
>> 1. It is not representative of the actual traffic flows on the =
Internet.
>=20
> There are an infinite number of things it=92s not representative of, =
but it also doesn=92t claim to be representative of them. Traffic flows =
on the Internet is a different survey of a different thing, but if =
someone can figure out how to do it well, I would be very supportive of =
their effort. It's a _much_ more difficult survey to do, since it =
requires getting people to pony up their unanonymized netflow data, =
which they=92re a lot less likely to do, en masse, than their peering =
data. We=92ve been trying to figure out a way to do it on a large and =
representative enough scale to matter for twenty years, without too much =
headway. The larger the Internet gets, the more difficult it is to =
survey well, so the problem gets harder with time, rather than easier.
This most likely won=92t happen unless it becomes some sort of an =
international treaty obligation and even then it would end up in courts =
for a long time. Leaving aside data privacy requirements many carriers =
have, most companies guard their traffic information rather zealously =
for some reason.
-dorian=
