[172193] in North American Network Operators' Group
=?Windows-1252?Q?Request_for_Community_Input_=96_Enhancing_ICANN_Accounta?=
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (John Curran)
Tue Jun 3 03:15:51 2014
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
From: John Curran <jcurran@arin.net>
To: North American Network Operators' Group <nanog@nanog.org>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2014 07:13:45 +0000
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
NANOG Folks -
There is a fairly important ICANN consultation going on which seeks in=
put from
the Internet community regarding ICANN's accountability mechanisms and=
the
desirability of any potential enhancements (this is context of ICANN o=
perating in
the absence of a contractual relationship with the US Government.)
This topic has the potential for significant impact on the administrat=
ion of both
Internet DNS names and IP addresses, so those who have strong views in=
these
matters might want to provide input accordingly (See the attached mes=
sage to
PPML providing pointers to the consultation) The RIRs, as coordinate=
d via the
NRO, have a draft response (attached) and input on that is welcome as =
well.
ICANN extended the deadline to the end of this week, which provides th=
is
opportunity to obtain additional community input.
Thanks!
/John
John Curran
President and CEO
ARIN
Begin forwarded message:
From: ARIN <info@arin.net<mailto:info@arin.net>>
Subject: [arin-ppml] Request for Community Input =96 Enhancing ICANN Accoun=
tability
Date: June 2, 2014 at 12:03:44 PM PDT
To: <arin-ppml@arin.net<mailto:arin-ppml@arin.net>>
ICANN issued a call for community input regarding its continuing accountabi=
lity in the future in the absence of a contractual relationship with the U.=
S. Government.
https://www.icann.org/public-comments/enhancing-accountability-2014-05-06-e=
n
The Executive Council of the Number Resource Organization (NRO) has drafted=
a response on behalf of the five Regional Internet Registry (RIR) communit=
ies. (See below)
ARIN welcomes your feedback on this draft, and we will be accepting input t=
hrough 4 June 2014. Please send your comments to info@arin.net.
The community may also participate directly by providing feedback directly =
to ICANN as described here:
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/enhancing-accountability-2014-05-06-e=
n
Regards,
Communications and Member Services
American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN)
***
ICANN call for public comments on Enhancing ICANN=92s Accountability
Response from the Number Resource Organization (NRO)
DRAFT ONLY - 29 May 2014
The NRO thanks ICANN for the opportunity to comment on means for improving =
its accountability, and we provide the following responses to the questions=
contained in the call for comments:
https://www.icann.org/public-comments/enhancing-accountability-2014-05-06-e=
n
1. What issues does the community identify as being core to strengthening I=
CANN=92s overall accountability in the absence of its historical contractua=
l relationship to the US government?
Regarding ICANN's accountability with respect to IP addressing functions, w=
e believe that the ASO structure provides a necessary and sufficient separa=
tion between policy formation and policy implementation. Global IP address=
ing policy is developed by the RIR communities and passed via the ASO to IC=
ANN, in accordance with the ASO MoU; while policy is implemented by the IAN=
A in the form of services delivered to the RIRs under specific service agre=
ements. While these existing mechanisms have proven successful over the pas=
t 10 years, we believe than a review is appropriate at this time, prior to =
the expected NTIA transition, along with reviews by each of the RIRs of the=
ir own accountability mechanisms.
Notwishstanding any improvements needed, these agreements must clearly defi=
ne appropriate dispute resolution, escalation and arbitration procedures. =
We note that there is no agreement or expectation of any role for the USG N=
TIA in these processes; therefore we do not view the historical contractual=
relationship between ICANN and the US government as an accountability mech=
anism, and neither do we consider the NTIA's role as a source of ICANN=92s =
accountability with respect to Internet number resources. In the hypothet=
ical case that IANA had ever failed to provide number allocation services t=
o any RIR in accordance to existing policies and agreements, we would have =
not relied upon the US government to solve this issue. Rather we would have=
worked transparently with ICANN, in accordance to the terms of existing ag=
reements, to address the issue.
The NRO is committed to continue to work with ICANN to strengthen escalatio=
n and dispute resolution mechanisms to allow the parties to work better in =
any hypothetical case of failed expectations.
2. What should be the guiding principles to ensure that the notion of accou=
ntability is understood and accepted globally? What are the consequences if=
the ICANN Board is not being accountable to the community? Is there anythi=
ng that should be added to the Working Group=92s mandate?
The NRO does not believe that the contract with the US government should be=
replaced with a similar mechanism at a global level, therefore a guiding p=
rinciple is specifically not to create any "superior" structure or organisa=
tion; rather ICANN's accountability should be defined in terms of transpar=
ent agreements with ICANN stakeholders, in which roles and responsibilities=
, and dispute resolution and arbitration mechanisms are fully defined.
We believe that a failure by ICANN to abide clearly by established accounta=
bility mechanisms, and in particular by defined dispute resolution and arbi=
tration mechanisms should have clear consequences, and therefore that arbit=
ration mechanisms should be binding. Furthermore, they must be implementab=
le and effective upon ICANN, regardless of its final structure or locale.
The guiding principles for defining or strengthening these accountability m=
echanisms should be: that they are transparent, implementable and open to i=
mprovement; and that they operate in the interests of the open, stable and =
secure operation of the Internet.
3. Do the Affirmation of Commitments and the values expressed therein need =
to evolve to support global acceptance of ICANN=92s accountability and so, =
how?
The NRO believes that the Affirmation of Commitments is a good umbrella cov=
ering higher-level issues that may not be specifically included in existing=
contracts, MoUs, accountability frameworks and documents that govern ICANN=
=92s relationships with its different stakeholder groups. While the most im=
portant accountability of ICANN is with its respective stakeholders and com=
munity, the Affirmation of Commitments and its evolution could support wide=
r trust in ICANN=92s ongoing operations at the international level.
We believe that this evolution could take the form of a new affirmation int=
o which many more stakeholder communities, including Governments, would ent=
er.
4. What are the means by which the Community is assured that ICANN is meeti=
ng its accountability commitments?
The current contracts, MoUs, accountability frameworks and documents that I=
CANN currently has with different parts of its community provide certain le=
vels of accountability. These documents can evolve and improve however this=
should be an ongoing process which continues beyond the end of NTIA=92s ro=
le, and throughout the entire lifetime of ICANN.
5. Are there other mechanisms that would better ensure that ICANN lives up =
to its commitments?
If ICANN can in time be incorporated as an international organization under=
international law, this may provide the ICANN community with additional me=
chanisms to solve disputes through mediation, arbitration or judicial avenu=
es; and added confidence in the ability to serve stakeholders uniformly acr=
oss the globe. While we would like this possibility to be actively explore=
d by ICANN, we do not believe it is a necessary prerequisite to any of the =
other measures described in this response, but welcome continued engagement=
with the global stakeholder community on this topic.
6. What additional comments would you like to share that could be of use to=
the ICANN Accountability Working Group?
The NRO notes the present clarity of responsibility that exists with respec=
t ICANN's roles in administration of Internet protocol identifiers for the =
IETF and Internet number resources for the Internet address community, and =
suggests that it might helpful for the ICANN Accountability Working Group t=
o examine these successes in its efforts. The NRO expects to contribute an=
d work together with the ICANN Accountability Working Group, and other stak=
eholders in the ICANN community, to improve mechanisms for enhancing accoun=
tability in the years to come.
_______________________________________________
PPML
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