[171448] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: We hit half-million: The Cidr Report
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Blake Dunlap)
Wed Apr 30 09:46:10 2014
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
In-Reply-To: <53607553.7020206@utc.edu>
From: Blake Dunlap <ikiris@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 08:45:41 -0500
To: NANOG list <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
Just out of curiosity, how does removing port address translation from
the equation magically and suddenly make everything exposed, and
un-invent the firewall?
-Blake
On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 11:00 PM, Jeff Kell <jeff-kell@utc.edu> wrote:
> On 4/29/2014 11:37 PM, TheIpv6guy . wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 7:54 PM, Jeff Kell <jeff-kell@utc.edu> wrote:
>>> On 4/29/2014 2:06 PM, Owen DeLong wrote:
>>>> If everyone who had 30+ inaggregable IPv4 prefixes replaced them with =
1 (or even 3) IPv6 prefixes=E2=80=A6
>>>> As a bonus, we could get rid of NAT, too. ;-)
>>>> /me ducks (but you know I had to say it)
>>> Yeah, just when we thought Slammer / Blaster / Nachi / Welchia / etc /
>>> etc had been eliminated by process of "can't get there from here"... w=
e
>>> expose millions more endpoints...
>>>
>>> /me ducks too (but you know *I* had to say it)
>>>
>> No ducking here. You forgot Nimda. Do you have an example from the
>> last 10 years of this class ?
>
> Oh? Anything hitting portmapper (tcp/135), or CIFS (tcp/445), or RDP
> (tdp/3389 -- CVE-2012-0002 ring any bells?).
>
> The vulnerabilities never stop. We just stop paying attention because
> most of us have blocked 135-139 and 445 and 3389 at the border long ago.
>
> Now granted that 80/443 (server-side) are more dangerous these days :)
> But that doesn't eliminate the original risks.
>
> These are ports that were originally open by default... and if you
> "don't" have a perimeter policy, you're "wrong" (policy, compliance,
> regulation, etc).
>
> Not to mention that PCI compliance requires you are RFC1918 (non-routed)
> at your endpoints, but I digress...
>
> Jeff
>
