[169139] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Permitting spoofed traffic [Was: Re: ddos attack blog]
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Paul Ferguson)
Fri Feb 14 21:05:43 2014
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 18:05:11 -0800
From: Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster@mykolab.com>
To: Larry Sheldon <LarrySheldon@cox.net>
In-Reply-To: <52FEA00B.5080508@cox.net>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Reply-To: fergdawgster@mykolab.com
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
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On 2/14/2014 3:00 PM, Larry Sheldon wrote:
> On 2/14/2014 12:42 PM, Paul Ferguson wrote:
>> Taken to the logical extreme, the "right thing" to do is to deny
>> any spoofed traffic from abusing these services altogether.
>
> Since the 1990s I have argued (ineffectively, it turns out) a case
> that says that sentence can be edited down to good advantage as:
>
>> Taken to the logical extreme, the "right thing" to do is to deny
>> any spoofed traffic.
>
But of course. :-)
- - ferg
- --
Paul Ferguson
VP Threat Intelligence, IID
PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2
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