[168972] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: BCP38 (was: Re: Why won't providers source-filter attacks?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Chris Grundemann)
Fri Feb 7 16:25:22 2014
In-Reply-To: <059837B2-A908-43DF-BC23-E6612EAF90C2@arbor.net>
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2014 14:25:01 -0700
From: Chris Grundemann <cgrundemann@gmail.com>
To: "Dobbins, Roland" <rdobbins@arbor.net>
Cc: NANOG list <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 2:07 PM, Dobbins, Roland <rdobbins@arbor.net> wrote:
>
> On Feb 8, 2014, at 3:37 AM, John Curran <jcurran@arin.net> wrote:
>
> > It's also true that if a sizable group of network operators were to
> actually deploy source address validation (thus proving that it really is a
> reasonable approach and doesn't carry too much operational or vendor
> implications), then it would be quite reasonable for those operators to
> bring the results to NANOG and get it recognized as a best current
> operating practice for networks of similar design/purpose.
>
> Many already do - including operators of very large networks. There are
> operational, vendor, and topological considerations which mean that it's
> achieved utilizing various mechanisms in different scenarios.
>
Documenting those various mechanisms which are actually utilized is the key
here. =)
$0.02
~Chris
--
@ChrisGrundemann
http://chrisgrundemann.com
