[168858] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Why won't providers source-filter attacks? Simple.
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Paul Ferguson)
Wed Feb 5 22:41:24 2014
Date: Wed, 05 Feb 2014 19:41:03 -0800
From: Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster@mykolab.com>
To: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
In-Reply-To: <20140206033537.9A454E7FF56@rock.dv.isc.org>
Cc: NANOG list <nanog@nanog.org>
Reply-To: fergdawgster@mykolab.com
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
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On 2/5/2014 7:35 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> In message <52F2FF98.2030507@mykolab.com>, Paul Ferguson writes:
>> On 2/5/2014 7:06 PM, Jimmy Hess wrote:
>>
>>> The last-mile is the best possible place to filter, without
>>> breaking things.
>>
>> I could not agree more. :-)
>>
>> - - ferg
>
> Remember "last mile" includes "datacenter" and "noc".
>
Whatever gets it done.
I'm just sick of hearing why people can't do it, instead of reasons
why they can.
- - ferg
- --
Paul Ferguson
VP Threat Intelligence, IID
PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2
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