[167896] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: NSA able to compromise Cisco, Juniper, Huawei switches
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Chris Boyd)
Tue Dec 31 13:55:36 2013
From: Chris Boyd <cboyd@gizmopartners.com>
In-Reply-To: <CALFTrnOtGF+Juc54dQcOEfCVC-cmHb_L6bc6h_HG5_6-Y7BaMA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2013 12:55:10 -0600
To: "nanog@nanog.org list" <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Dec 31, 2013, at 7:05 AM, Ray Soucy wrote:
> I think there needs to be some clarification on how these tools get =
used,
> how often they're used, and if they're ever cleaned up when no longer =
part
> of an active operation. Of course we'll never get that.
But that's exactly what we need.
Look at CALEA. It has its warts and issues, but the rules are published =
so everyone knows how the game is played. Even with NSLs, there's =
apparently some oversight, and you can challenge certain aspects (though =
it's a long and expensive process).
But backdooring gear, servers, BIOS, etc. has no rules. It's just =
chaos. You don't know if a customer has been targeted, so you can't =
take appropriate steps. You have no way of knowing if your gear is =
backdoored or who is using the backdoor. And simply knowing that there =
is a backdoor will increase the chances that it will be found and used =
by others.
The known threat landscape has been increased by orders of magnitude.
--Chris
