[159263] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Gmail and SSL
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Christopher Morrow)
Wed Jan 2 20:03:42 2013
In-Reply-To: <CAP-guGWJG_HUKToQntKmxA1Hj-GbdAbd6t06o2y6akpKMEuUaA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2013 20:03:32 -0500
From: Christopher Morrow <christopher.morrow@gmail.com>
To: William Herrin <bill@herrin.us>
Cc: John Levine <johnl@iecc.com>, nanog list <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Jan 2, 2013 7:36 PM, "William Herrin" <bill@herrin.us> wrote:
>
> >
> > Me, no, although I have read credible reports that otherwise reputable
SSL
> > signers have issued MITM certs to governments for their filtering
firewalls.
>
That's not the case join is referring to.
> The governments in question are watching for exfiltration and they
No, not really. Some are busy tracking "dissidents" among their populations.
> largely use a less risky approach: they issue their own root key and,
> in most cases, install it in the government employees' browser before
> handing them the machine.
>
Not just for employees.
> A "reputable" SSL signer would have to get outed just once issuing a
> government a resigning cert and they'd be kicked out of all the
> browsers. They'd be awfully easy to catch.
>
Oh! You mean like cyber trust and etilisat? Right... That's working just
perfectly...
> Regards,
> Bill Herrin
>
>
> --
> William D. Herrin ................ herrin@dirtside.com bill@herrin.us
> 3005 Crane Dr. ...................... Web: <http://bill.herrin.us/>
> Falls Church, VA 22042-3004
>
