[159225] in North American Network Operators' Group

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Re: Gmail and SSL

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Christopher Morrow)
Tue Jan 1 17:46:59 2013

In-Reply-To: <rrls14xgp4qyrabj11u4t4c4.1357067055063@email.android.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2013 17:46:20 -0500
From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
To: kmedcalf <kmedcalf@dessus.com>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org

On Tue, Jan 1, 2013 at 2:04 PM, Keith Medcalf <kmedcalf@dessus.com> wrote:
> Perhaps Googles other "harvesters" and the government agents they sell or
> give user credentials to, don't work against privately (not under the
> goverment thumb) encryption keys without the surveillance state expending
> significantly more resources.
>
> Perhaps the cheapest way to solve this is to apply thumbscrews and have
> google require the use of co-option freindly keying material by their
> victims errr customers errr users.

you lost me in conspiracy theories, can you rephrase?


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